Posts Tagged ‘superflu’

Science| Special Issue: H5N1 [exploring the “supervirus” controversy]

29 June, 2012

See on Scoop.itVirology News

“Introduction
The publication in this issue of these research papers on the airborne tranimssion [sic] of H5N1 marks the end of 8 months of controversy over whether some of the data, now freely accessible, should be withheld in the public interest.”

 

I think this is an important landmark in the so-called “dual use” debate: that is, the propensity of bodies in the US to attempt to regulate the release of information that MAY be usable in the making of bioweapons, or be usable in bioterror attacks.

 

Let us diffidently point out at this juncture that it is only really the superpowers who are definitively known in recent years to have had bioweapons programmes – apart from apartheid-era South Africa, that is! – and that damn nearly ANYTHING published on transmission or mechanisms of pathogenicity of human or animal pathogens (or even plant, for that matter) could be termed “dual use” if someone wanted to – and censored as a result.

 

It is also – as I tire of pointing out – possible to PROTECT against H5NX viruses using conventional vaccines right now – and the new universal flu vaccines coming on stream will almost certainly make this even more feasible.

 

The fact is that H5N1 flu is an ever-present threat to people living in Egypt, Indonesia, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Thailand and China – WITHOUT being weaponised.  It is no more than a notional threat to the US or Europe – and keeping information that could help in understanding how or how soon the virus could mutate to pandemicity out of people’s hands, is simply stupid. 

See on www.sciencemag.org

Five Mutations Make H5N1 Airborne | The Scientist

23 June, 2012

See on Scoop.itVirology News

“After more than 6 months of heated discussion, the second group that succeeded in making the H5N1 avian flu transmissible between ferrets, considered a good model for human transmission, has published its results. The paper, which came out today (June 21) in Science, demonstrates that only five mutations are needed to confer this aerosol transmissibility among mammals, and that re-assortment between different types of viruses—a technique used by the other group, which published its results last month in Nature—is not necessary.

Said Fouchier in a press conference “We both find … loss of glycosylation at the tip of the HA molecule, and this loss of glycosylation seems to increase the receptor binding specificity of the HA”. And though not all the mutations identified in the two studies match, “the mutations that are not identical still have a similar phenotypic trait,” he added.”

 

So this is what all the fuss was about?  This is what the NSABB did not want everyone to know?  How could they POSSIBLY think that the international virology and infectious disease community should be kept in the dark about this?  What this work has done has pointed the way along a path that will lead us to understand why and how influenza viruses change in order to more effectively get transmitted when they switch hosts – which is a good thing, surely.

And yet all they see is bioterrorism.

See on the-scientist.com